[Financially excluded in the &#039;&#039;Lucky Country&#039;&#039;: lessons from under-banked Australia] in Financial inclusion: Policies and practices by Godinho, V et al.
Thank
7KH50
RXWSXWV
50,75
Citatio
See th
Version
Copyri
Link to
you for do
,75HVHDUF
RI50,78
HVHDUFK5H
n: 
is record i
:
ght Statem
 Published
wnloading
K5HSRVLWR
QLYHUVLW\UHV
SRVLWRU\KWWSUHVHDUFKEDQNUPLWHGXDX
n the RMI
ent: © 
 Version:
 this docum
U\LVDQRSH
HDUFKHUV
T Researc
ent from 
QDFFHVVG
h Reposit
the RMIT R
DWDEDVHVK
ory at: 
esearch R
RZFDVLQJW
epository
KHUHVHDUF

K
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE THIS PAGE
Godinho, V, Singh, S and Russell, R 2015, '[Financially excluded in the ''Lucky Country'':
lessons from under-banked Australia] in Financial inclusion: Policies and practices', IIMB
Management Review, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 282-287
https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/view/rmit:35783
Published Version
 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Indian
Institute of Management / Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International License
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2015.09.004
ROUND TABLE
Financial inclusion: Policies and practices
Thankom Arun a,*, Rajalaxmi Kamath b
a University of Central Lancashire, UK
b Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India
Received 5 May 2015; revised 24 August 2015; accepted 23 September 2015; available online 12 November 2015
KEYWORDS
Financial inclusion;
Access to ﬁnance;
Progressive approach;
Behavioural constraints;
Financial capability
Abstract As a key enabler for development, ﬁnancial inclusion is ﬁrmly placed on the agenda
of most governments as a key policy priority. Against this background, this round table provides
a global and regional perspective on the policies and practices of ﬁnancial inclusion. Using macro
data, the collection reveals the diversity in the efforts towards achieving ﬁnancial inclusion and
the need for a progressive approach in ﬁnancial inclusion. Further to this, the round table pro-
vides the regional perspectives on the policies and practices of ﬁnancial inclusion in India, South
Africa, and Australia.
© 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Indian Institute of Management
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Financial inclusion: policies and
practices—an overview
Thankom Arun and Rajalaxmi Kamath
Globally, ﬁnancial inclusion is a major policy concern with gov-
ernments across the world. The lack of access of a large per-
centage of working age adults to the formal ﬁnancial sector is
a genuine global policy concern (as evidenced in the G20 Pitts-
burgh Summit in 2009 and Alliance for Financial Inclusion’s Maya
Declaration in 2011). However, other than the aspect of pro-
viding access, ﬁnancial inclusion includes issues such as helping
people manage their resources in a better way and building ﬁ-
nancial capabilities. A comprehensive approach by the Center
for Financial Inclusion deﬁnes full ﬁnancial inclusion as a “state
in which everyone who can use them has access to a full suite
of quality ﬁnancial services, provided at affordable prices, in
a convenient manner, with respect and dignity” (http://
www.centerforﬁnancialinclusion.org/).
The ﬁnancial reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that took place
in most economies were expected to improve ﬁnancial depth
and the use of formal ﬁnancial services such as loans, savings,
payment services, and other related services. However, the
degree of access to and use of formal ﬁnancial services is still
very low. Although we have theoretical and empirical support
for ﬁnancial market liberalisation (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,
1973), there are concerns about the way in which the reforms
have been carried out (Stiglitz, 2000). One of the main causes
of the difference between the ﬁnancial liberalisation theory
and evidence rests with the idealistic assumptions, such as
perfect information (Arestis & Demetriades, 1997), without
considering the challenging nature of legal and institutional
frameworks in countries. It is worthwhile to note that the
global economy could be boosted by additional savings of up
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to $157bn a year, if the “unbanked” adults save through
microﬁnance programmes (Allan, Massu, & Svarer, 2013). Fur-
thermore, a broader outreach of ﬁnance enables talented new-
comers from disadvantaged groups to be empowered (Beck
& de la Torre, 2006), and can have a larger impact on the
design and implementation of other development policies.
Financial inclusion can improve the efﬁcacy of government
payment of social safety net transfers and the new types of
ﬁnancial innovation can lower transaction costs which can
bring more private sector involvement in international de-
velopment (Cull, Ehrbeck, & Holle, 2014). In all likelihood,
the ﬁnancial inclusion agenda will have a major role in the
post 2015 sustainable development agenda.
Many national governments and international institu-
tions have been leading major policy initiatives to bridge the
gap between ﬁnancial inclusion and the poor. The Pradhan
Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana in India is an example of a state-led
initiative towards universal ﬁnancial inclusion taken up on a
mission mode. There is no denying that this ambitious aim
of a universal zero-balance, no-frills bank account faces many
a hurdle. Banks and their staff have to gear up to meet the
large increase in accounts, especially in the remote regions
of the nation. There are still large sections of the popula-
tion with no access to a bank-branch. However, this much-
publicised initiative sends an important message that formal
ﬁnancial institutions such as banks are best suited to take
forward the mission of ﬁnancial inclusion. The access to credit,
savings, and remittance instruments begins with the exis-
tence of a bank account. It is a break from the past where
most ﬁnancial inclusion initiatives were supply-led. Here, by
asking people to open no-frills bank accounts, this process
has willy-nilly become demand-driven. Technology could also
play a role in enhancing the ﬁnancial inclusion agenda, as in
sub-Saharan Africa, where 12% of adults have a mobile money
account and 45% of them rely on mobile phones alone for
formal banking.
Against the background of growing supply side initiatives
and the increasing awareness of the demand side barriers,
this round table attempts to understand the global picture
of ﬁnancial inclusion and the intricacies of the challenges in-
volved in achieving full ﬁnancial inclusion. The round table
includes three papers that were presented in the track on ﬁ-
nancial inclusion at the ninth Annual International Confer-
ence on Public Policy and Management at the Indian Institute
of Management Bangalore (IIMB), India, in 2014. It also in-
cludes two other contributions that have been included to
provide a global macro perspective of the situation on policy
and practice.
The article by Elisabeth Rhyne shows that despite coun-
tries taking measures for ﬁnancial inclusion, a wide diversity
of performance exists across countries. The paper uses Global
Microscope data to assess the ﬁnancial inclusion policies. In
addition, the paper presents a sample of Peru, India, Kenya,
andChina, and highlights the area inwhich each country excels
and one inwhich it lags. TheMicroscope data used in the paper
reveals a strong correlation between the countries that per-
formed well in supporting microﬁnance and on ﬁnancial in-
clusion. Furthermore, the 2014 Microscope data endorse the
global trend towards regulation which is reassuring in the
context of the efforts made towards greater inclusion. This
measure takes forward the idea of expert-judgemental score-
cards, where lacking historical data, businesses use expert
judgements to assess new or potential market segments. This
is a subjective measure as it relies on country expertise and
organisational know-how of experts. However, there have to
be purposeful attempts in the selection of experts to make
themeasure unbiased. Statistical indices, on the other hand,
by their very formulation take into account all data points
and tend to be objective and unbiased.
The paper by Jain, Zubenko, and Carotenuto is an inquiry
into the policy environment for ﬁnancial inclusion and mea-
sures adoption and degree of usage of ﬁnancial products for
30 countries. The paper follows a progressive approach to ﬁ-
nancial inclusion, enabling access to and driving usage of the
different ﬁnancial products such as payments, lending, long-
term savings/investments, and insurance. The study reveals
the progression of ﬁnancial inclusion in the countries, based
on usage of payment products. Such a framework enables the
countries to have an indicative and a reﬂective appraisal of
the requirements for the implementation of the ﬁnancial in-
clusion agenda.
The paper by Rao and Anand sheds light on the develop-
ment of the ﬁnancial inclusion agenda in the context of ﬁ-
nancial sector reforms in India since 1991. The paper rightly
identiﬁes the concern regarding high interest rates, one of
the most relevant issues in an uneven rural credit market.
Furthermore, the paper discusses the lack of transparency
about and information on the functioning and ﬁnancing of
microﬁnance institutions (MFIs). The suggestion of a single
point regulator with a mechanism for monitoring activities
of lending entities, and the discussion on the emergence of
newer organisational forms in the journey of ﬁnancial inclu-
sion offers valuable insights into the future policy develop-
ments in the sector.
The paper by Kostov, Arun, Annim, and Adjasi discusses
the potential lack of demand for ﬁnancial services, provid-
ing a demand perspective into the access to ﬁnance debate.
In SouthAfrica, a behavioural lethargy towards newandemerg-
ing ﬁnancial institutions exists due to the perceived high cost
nature of ﬁnancial services. Even the entry level accounts such
as Mzansi become increasingly dormant, affected by volun-
tary non-participation. The paper highlights a careful recon-
sideration of behavioural constraints on ﬁnancial inclusion.
The paper by Godinho, Singh, and Russel discusses the case
of Indigenous people in Australia who are socio-economically
marginalised and ﬁnancially excluded. Their situation has been
aggravated by the lower physical and digital access to banking
and other service infrastructure, which restricts the capac-
ity of user centred ﬁnancial inclusion policies. This paper
reminds us that ﬁnancial exclusion, induced by social, cul-
tural, and geographical exclusion is not a problem of the de-
veloping world alone. There are pockets of such socially and
geographically induced ﬁnancial exclusion even in the de-
veloped countries, which could learn from the chequered
history of ﬁnancial inclusion in the developing world. The paper
suggests measures such as the sustainability of remote ﬁ-
nancial service delivery practices and culturally relevant poli-
cies to enhance the ﬁnancial capability of indigenous
communities which would enable their ﬁnancial inclusion.
The papers have taken stock of the progress made so far
in promoting ﬁnancial inclusion globally and at country levels,
and provided multiple perspectives of ﬁnancial inclusion. The
combined efforts of the entire ﬁnancial sector in develop-
ing viable business models and in setting ﬁnancial inclusion
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targets may take ﬁnancial inclusion agenda to newer heights.
The country level papers have suggested the need for re-
sponsive regulatory frameworks, digital access to ﬁnance, and
more consideration of behavioural constraints in ﬁnancial in-
clusion programmes. The in-depth understanding provided in
these papers on policies and practices of ﬁnancial inclusion
will set the agenda for the future pathways of ﬁnancial in-
clusion discourse.
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Global
Microscope: a tool for assessing ﬁnancial
inclusion policy
Elisabeth Rhyne, Managing Director, Center for
Financial Inclusion Accion, U.S.A
Over the past few years, the global policy community has in-
creasingly embraced ﬁnancial inclusion as an objective for
the ﬁnancial sector and general economic development. The
G-20 ﬁrst agreed to pursue a ﬁnancial inclusion agenda in 2008,
and in 2010 it established the Global Partnership for Finan-
cial Inclusion to carry the agenda forward. In 2008, the Al-
liance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) was founded as a peer
exchange body for regulators from developing countries. The
AFI created the Maya Declaration process through which gov-
ernments announce speciﬁc national ﬁnancial inclusion com-
mitments. As a result of these global movements and many
local factors, several governments around the world have de-
veloped ﬁnancial inclusion strategies. But have these efforts
progressed beyond high level rhetoric?
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) “Global Micro-
scope on Financial Inclusion, 2014” assesses the policy en-
vironment for ﬁnancial inclusion in 55 countries. The
Microscope examines 12 policy dimensions essential for cre-
ating a solid regulatory and institutional framework within
which ﬁnancial inclusion can develop. As a group, these 12
dimensions address ﬁnancial inclusion holistically, from the
perspective that full ﬁnancial inclusion involves extending
access to the previously excluded to a range of ﬁnancial prod-
ucts that they can use safely, affordably, and conveniently.
With this perspective, ﬁnancial inclusion is more than just
mobile payments or “banking the unbanked”. It includes access
to credit, savings, and insurance products that meet the needs
of lower income people. As they signal intent by launching
ﬁnancial inclusion strategies with concrete goals, govern-
ments actively pursue ﬁnancial inclusion by ensuring that their
regulatory and supervisory capacity adequately covers the in-
stitutions that serve the poor, by welcoming the technology
innovations that will bring costs down and broaden out-
reach, and by ensuring that systems are in place to protect
consumers. The Microscope’s indicators are built around these
elements.
The methodology for the Microscope study involves the cre-
ation of a scoring model by a small team made up of the EIU
and ﬁnancial inclusion experts from the Microscope’s spon-
soring organisations: the Inter American Development Bank,
CAF, Citi Financial Inclusion, and the Center for Financial In-
clusion at Accion. This team, in consultation with addi-
tional subject matter experts, selected the 12 key dimensions,
identiﬁed sub-indicators for each, and laid out the criteria
used to judge performance. The EIU then applied its own ex-
perience in constructing rankings to develop a robust scoring
model based on this input, and mobilised its analysts around
the world to collect relevant data. In each case, the ana-
lysts sought to know: Are there adequate policies in exis-
tence which are recorded or on the books? Are the policies
being implemented well? In the view of industry partici-
pants, are they working? Data were gathered from both written
laws and regulations, and interviews with regulators, pro-
viders, and other sector participants. The resulting model,
data, and rankings represent the best readily available source
for judging the state of ﬁnancial inclusion policy around the
world.
One of the most important observations to come from the
Microscope’s 2014 results is the wide diversity of perfor-
mance across countries. For each country a summary score is
computed on a scale from 0 to 100. The actual scores range from
top-ranked Peru, with a score of 87, to lowest-ranked Haiti, with
a score of 16. This wide range reveals that while a few coun-
tries have addressed ﬁnancial inclusionmore successfully, many
have substantial gaps, and some have barely begun to address
the challenges. The countries in the top 10 group, led by Peru,
Colombia and the Philippines, generally have highly capable ﬁ-
nancial sector regulators who have made sustained effort over
years to expand the reach of ﬁnancial services. A number of
countries at the bottom of the rankings have experienced recent
political instability (notably several in the Middle East), or have
governments whose guiding principles do not prioritise the de-
velopment of a strong, independent ﬁnancial sector. The large
number of countries in the middle ranks suggests that regula-
tors in those places have worked on one or more aspects of ﬁ-
nancial inclusion policy, but the countries do not have consistent
strong policies in all areas.
The Microscope’s overall country rankings have captured
the attention of regulators and ﬁnancial inclusion experts,
and are the subject of many subsequent discussions. But there
is much more to the Microscope than the summary scores. The
depth of information available in the model allows a closer
diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of any given
country. To illustrate, I present here a sample of three rela-
tively high-scoring countries from different world regions—
Peru, India, and Kenya—and one relatively low-scoring
country—China, singling out for each country an area in which
it excels and one in which it lags.
Peru: Peru received the highest possible scores in 7 of the
12 categories, including most of the categories measuring regu-
lation and supervision of savings and credit, reﬂecting the
depth and quality of regulation and supervision of ﬁnancial
inclusion in the country. This results from the sustained efforts
of a strong and independent supervisory authority that
prioritises both ﬁnancial system stability and outreach to the
lower segments of the population. Peru’s weakest score is in
the area of electronic payments, reﬂecting the fact that it
has only recently put the elements needed to foster such pay-
ments into place. In 2013, Peru passed a comprehensive elec-
tronic money law, which allows the issuance of e-money from
mobile phone companies and others. Taking advantage of this
legislation, in late 2014, the banking association launched a
new electronic payments initiative. These important devel-
opments lay the groundwork for growth in electronic pay-
ments, and will undoubtedly result in an even higher score
for Peru in the future.
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India: India scored very well overall (tying with Mexico for
5th place), thanks in part to reforms adopted in response to
the Mor Committee’s recommendations in 2013. India scored
at the very top in only one area, micro-insurance, reﬂecting
longstanding attention to the need to provide insurance cover
to lower income people. Since 2002, Indian regulations have
directed insurance companies to attend to the low end of the
market, and over the years Indian micro-insurance has de-
veloped a depth of experience that is unrivalled across the
world. However, it is noted that the regulations are highly
directive, which at this later stage in the sector’s develop-
ment may have an effect on slowing innovation.
India’s weakest score was in the core area of prudential
supervision, due to two factors—ﬁrst, the use of directed man-
dates to banks to fulﬁl policy aims (rather than reserving the
scope of prudential regulation to ensuring solvency and li-
quidity) and second, the regulatory preference given to com-
mercial banks, leaving weaknesses among the smaller
institutions catering to lower income consumers. While the
former is politically difﬁcult to change, the latter is the subject
of a number of reform proposals now in the process, such as
the introduction of specialised payment banks.
Kenya: It is not surprising that Kenya, where mobile money
ﬁrst took off in a big way, would merit the top score in elec-
tronic payments. Kenya is well into its second generation of
regulatory guidance on electronic payments, building on and
seeking to improve upon its ﬁrst generation. New regula-
tions in 2014 encourage interoperability and introduce a new
form of virtual mobile network operators. Bothmeasures foster
a more competitive marketplace to counter the market-
dominant position of Safaricom’s MPesa mobile money service.
On the other hand, Kenya scores poorly on consumer protec-
tion, especially market conduct regulation. It does not have
dedicated ﬁnancial consumer protection legislation or spe-
cialised supervision. In a positive step, however, regulators
are working to introduce systematic interest rate disclosure
rules that would enable consumers to compare rates more
easily across institutions.
China: China is a relative newcomer to ﬁnancial inclu-
sion, having identiﬁed it as a formal policy aim only in 2013,
after making a number of reforms throughout the previous
decade to extend the features of a market economy to the
lower income population. Its low rank on the Microscope (42nd
out of 55 countries) reﬂects its early-day status. China scores
relatively well on micro-insurance, though its experience there
is relatively new. It began testing micro-insurance regula-
tions in several provinces in 2008 and in 2012 rolled out a plan
to cover the whole nation. China’s large, state-owned insur-
ance companies can expand coverage quickly in response to
such policy directives, though there are numerous smaller
private companies that are also making bids to cover more
people.
One of the areas in which China scores lowest is regula-
tion of deposit-taking. China imposes a low ceiling on deposit
rates, which discourages savings, and it lacks deposit insur-
ance, which tends to concentrate savings in the largest, safest
institutions. In order to create a more competitive market-
place, plans have been announced to eliminate the ceiling
and instal deposit insurance, which would encourage savings
and make it possible for smaller ﬁnancial institutions to
compete. With these reforms in place, China’s score on the
deposits indicator would undoubtedly rise.
For those wishing to use the Microscope as a research tool,
the Microscope offers two formats for analysis. The Micro-
scope report provides scores, rankings, and summaries at re-
gional and country levels. Researchers wishing to investigate
individual countries or topics will want to explore the Micro-
scope model, an interactive excel-based model that con-
tains every score on every sub-indicator, a brief explanation
of the speciﬁc policies, initiatives and implementation status
that led to the score, and references to supporting documents.
Readers of the Microscope may ask whether better poli-
cies actually lead to greater ﬁnancial inclusion. As of today,
this question is difﬁcult to answer. The Global Findex, a cross-
country database on use of ﬁnancial services in 150 coun-
tries, provides the best measure available. However, data are
only available for one year (2011), and thus it is not pos-
sible to examine the dynamics of policy. The Findex data may
reﬂect the historical status of economic and ﬁnancial sector
development, rather than the more recent policies speciﬁc
to ﬁnancial inclusion. However, the Findex is set to publish
a second round of data sometime in 2015. Comparison of the
two data sets will allow analysts to investigate the correla-
tions between the growth in usage of ﬁnancial services and
the existence of good policies.
An analysis of the pre-2014 versions of the Microscope,
which were focussed speciﬁcally on microﬁnance, found strong
correlations across countries between the Microscope’s in-
dicators and measures of microﬁnance penetration and the
health of provider institutions. The 2014 Microscope found
that countries which scored well on support for microﬁnance
(now a subset of the whole scoring model) also tended to score
well on ﬁnancial inclusion more broadly, providing grist for
a hypothesis to be tested that strong ﬁnancial inclusion poli-
cies yield greater inclusion.
Creating conducive regulations is an iterative task, as policy
makers correct shortcomings of ﬁrst versions and react to a
rapidly changing scene, especially in the area of technol-
ogy. Countries cannot rise to the top of the rankings in a single
year. Nevertheless, the level of engagement captured in the
Microscope’s analysis conﬁrms that there is a broad global
trend towards regulation supportive of greater inclusion. Thus,
it falls to providers to respond with product offerings that
reach lower income people. And that brings up a host of ques-
tions of a different sort, involving the business case for ﬁ-
nancial inclusion and the effective design of ﬁnancial service
offerings and delivery channels that will appeal to new users
as tools for managing their economic lives.
A progressive approach to ﬁnancial inclusion
Amit Jain, Olga Zubenko, and George Carotenuto,
Master Card Foundation
Financial inclusion has emerged as a key global priority. Gov-
ernments, international development agencies, academics,
and the private sector, have all brought ﬁnancial inclusion
to the top of the agenda. The World Bank has made univer-
sal ﬁnancial access by 2020 as one of its goals, and reports
that more than 50 countries are actively developing ﬁnan-
cial inclusion plans and policies.
The urgency around ﬁnancial inclusion is not surprising,
given that 50% of the world’s adult population is still unbanked
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(Financial Access Initiative, 2010). Governments and busi-
nesses can be more efﬁcient, and unbanked populations will
ﬁnd a better quality of life if ﬁnancial products are ex-
tended to them. To give a sense of the magnitude of the ben-
eﬁts, South Africa’s government is expected to save close to
$400 million in administrative costs over ﬁve years by shift-
ing disbursement of social grants from cash to cards in 2011
(MasterCard Analysis, 2012).
Signiﬁcant progress has been made towards ﬁnancial in-
clusion; however, more work needs to be done. Practitio-
ners and decision makers have been continuously discussing
the most effective strategies for developing ﬁnancial inclu-
sion. Two issues at the forefront include treating ﬁnancial in-
clusion as a progression with dominant on-ramps versus a
binary state, and the importance of emphasising usage in ad-
dition to access. Using a data-driven approach, this study dem-
onstrates three key principles to provide some answers to
these issues as well as new insights on speciﬁc actions to ex-
pedite ﬁnancial inclusion.
Framing the dialogue on measuring ﬁnancial inclusion
The key to demonstrating the two principles is to effec-
tively measure the progress countries have made in en-
abling access to and driving usage of the different ﬁnancial
products—payments, lending, long-term savings/investments,
and insurance. The ﬁrst step is to deﬁne access and usage in
a way that is accurate and comprehensive. To achieve this,
the study identiﬁed that access and usage can be measured
at multiple levels.
Following is a detailed view of the levels that highlights
the appropriate deﬁnitions for access and usage:
1. Availability of products/Infrastructure: Level of product
availability (e.g., number of bank branches or agents per
100 000 adults).
2. Adoption of products: Actual ownership of the product
(e.g., a bank account).
3. Is the product used? (Occurrence): Has the consumer used
the product over a speciﬁed time period (e.g., past 30
days)?
4. Degree to which a product is used: Howmuch is the product
used to address the consumer’s needs (e.g., share of con-
sumer’s payments made with a payment product versus
cash)?
Based on these levels, “Adoption of products” is more rel-
evant as the deﬁnition of access because it is more quanti-
ﬁable than availability. Also, in this digital age of widely
available and distributed platforms such as mobile money/
banking, level of availability is becoming less relevant. Adop-
tion is what gives consumers the ability to use a product;
availability may not lead to adoption and hence, usage. Based
on these levels, the “Degree to which a product is used” is
more relevant as the deﬁnition of usage because it more ac-
curately reﬂects the amount of beneﬁt derived from the
product.
The other level of usage deﬁned by “Is the product used?”
is an either/or question and therefore very limiting. For
example, a customer whomakes one transaction amonth using
a payments product is different from a customer who makes
all transactions using the payments product. They are both
using the product, but they are in fact very different. Kenya,
which is discussed later in the paper, highlights this issue well.
Most people in Kenya have a payment product (e.g., M-Pesa)
and use it; however, most transactions are still in cash and
very few transactions ﬂow through Kenya’s electronic pay-
ments system. This view of usage is a unique way of think-
ing about ﬁnancial inclusion. The next step is to deﬁne the
metrics for measuring the adoption and degree of usage of
the different ﬁnancial products (Fig. 1).
Payments product adoption is deﬁned as the ownership of
a secure transactional account where people can store,
receive, and use money (e.g., prepaid cards, mobile money
accounts, and current accounts). Payments usage is divided
into payments inﬂows and payment outﬂows. Usage for inﬂows
refers to the use of payment products to receive salaries, gov-
ernment beneﬁts, and remittances via non-cash methods.
Usage for outﬂows refers to the use of the payments prod-
ucts to make non-cash purchases (e.g., retail payments, bill
payments) and non-cash remittances. While the notion of de-
ﬁning usage in terms of outﬂows is widely known, it is im-
portant to measure usage in terms of inﬂows—ﬁrst, because
receiving money in an account versus cash has its beneﬁts for
consumers like preventing leakage, and second, because
people are more likely to use the payments product for out-
ﬂows if there is money in the account than if there is none.
Study scope and approach
The study measures adoption and degree of usage of ﬁnan-
cial products for 30 countries globally.1 The study covers the
entire adult population in the countries, including salaried
employees, self-employed, owners of businesses, welfare/
beneﬁts dependent, and farmers. The ﬁndings of the study
apply not only to consumers but also to businesses, espe-
cially small and medium-sized businesses. The study lever-
ages current industry research and supplements it with
additional secondary research and expert interviews.
Key principle #1: Financial inclusion is a progression with
payments as the optimal entry point.
Fig. 2 shows the level of adoption of the different ﬁnan-
cial products in the 30 countries. In almost all countries, pay-
ments product adoption exceeds adoption of other products,
suggesting that payments are the optimal entry point for ﬁ-
nancial inclusion globally. For example, in all these coun-
tries there are many people who only have a payments product
(e.g., in Kenya at least 40% of adults and in the US, at least
20%). As adoption of products builds over time, higher pay-
ments product adoption reinforces the uptake of payments
products as the ﬁrst ﬁnancial product.
A few countries at very low levels of adoption, such as Peru,
Colombia, and Bangladesh, have made greater progress than
in payments by providing a savings product through
Microﬁnance Institutions (MFIs). But even in these coun-
tries, the savings account is a pseudo payments product, as
it is typically the only account that people have to hold funds,
and they make frequent cash withdrawals to make pay-
ments. As these countries advance, they would be
1 The countries covered in the study are the United States, Mexico,
Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Sweden, the UK, Belgium, Spain, Poland,
Germany, Italy, Egypt, Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, Kenya, Tan-
zania, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Bangla-
desh, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Japan.
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Figure 1 Metrics for adoption and degree of usage of ﬁnancial products.
Figure 2 Adoption of ﬁnancial products by country—2012. Sources: World Bank Findex and Databank, CIA Factbook, RBR Global Cards
Data, MIX, Euromonitor Passport, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook, Swiss RE, Country Statistics Bureaus, Local Interviews, Ad-
visors Analysis.
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expected to behave like other countries in focussing on true
payments products that enable non-cash payments.
While the adoption of a payments product is the ﬁrst step,
some usage is the next likely step. Getting the product will
typically be driven by a speciﬁc payment need (e.g., receiv-
ing salaries), and the customer is likely at least to use the
product to address that need. Using the payments product
also may serve as a conduit for consumers to adopt other prod-
ucts. Electronic payment transactions can provide useful in-
sights about consumers (e.g., creditworthiness) and enable
providers to offer other products. All other products involve
payments and the use of efﬁcient electronic payment mecha-
nisms to improve the economics for both consumers and pro-
viders. A higher correlation between the usage of payments
products (versus their adoption) and adoption of lending, long-
term savings/investments, and insurance products among the
countries in the study further supports this notion.
Payments as the ﬁrst step towards ﬁnancial inclusion are
also supported by empirical data. Services like Alipay, PayPal,
and M-Pesa started as pure payments products before mor-
phing into broader ﬁnancial product platforms. Beyond pay-
ments, a country’s path depends on local factors. For example,
long-term savings/investments appear to follow payments in
Brazil whereas in Italy, it is lending. This analysis demon-
strates that ﬁnancial inclusion occurs in steps with pay-
ments at the optimal entry point. This also validates earlier
research from MasterCard that stated that ﬁnancial inclu-
sion develops along a hierarchy of consumer ﬁnancial needs
with payments being the ﬁrst step (Fig. 3).
Progression in action
Let us see how this progression manifests in the real world.
Fig. 4 shows the ﬁnancial inclusion progression of the 30 coun-
tries based on adoption. It appears that countries follow four
stages of progression. Given that payments are the optimal
entry point for ﬁnancial inclusion, these four stages are pri-
marily characterised by the level of payments product
adoption.
The four stages are as follows.
Early days: This stage represents the beginning of the pro-
gression. In all countries, adoption of a payments product
is less than 50%, and adoption of other products is typi-
cally very low (less than 25%). Peru, Bangladesh, and Co-
lombia are further ahead than their peers in savings through
their MFI focus, as discussed earlier.
Transitioning: In this stage, payments adoption starts to
breakout with over 50% penetration. In several coun-
tries, adoption of one or more products also begins to gain
traction and catch up with payments adoption (e.g., long-
term savings/investments in China, credit in Italy).
Payments ready: In this stage, payments adoption reaches
a critical threshold of mass adoption (greater than 75%).
Countries are expected to be ready from a payments per-
spective (e.g. infrastructure) to enable advanced levels
of some other products. Here advanced levels vary by
product and are based on current levels of adoption in the
30 countries, speciﬁed as over 60% for lending, over 70%
for long-term savings/investments, and over 45% for in-
surance. This shows the expected behaviour, with lending
reaching advanced levels and investments and insurance
approaching it.
Most advanced: In this stage, payments adoption is ubiq-
uitous, and adoption of all other products is expected to
be at advanced levels. Germany, Belgium, and Sweden
show this expected behaviour while Japan and Singapore
are very close to it. The UK is at advanced levels in lending
and long-term savings/investments, but lagging a bit in in-
surance. Market-speciﬁc factors may be driving this and
must be further investigated.
Figure 3 Hierarchy of consumer ﬁnancial needs. Source: MasterCard Advisors Analysis 2014.
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Key principle #2: Usage of products is not guaranteed
because of adoption and must be an explicit goal.
Adoption of products is an important ﬁrst step for ﬁnan-
cial inclusion, but usage and the degree of usage are equally
important. As discussed earlier, usage of payments prod-
ucts can also facilitate the adoption and usage of additional
products. Adoption, however, does not automatically lead to
usage and not everyone owning a payments product uses it
for inﬂows. Usage needs to be proactively pursued. Across all
countries of the study, the number of adults who use a pay-
ments product for receiving any of their inﬂows is less than
the number of adults who own a payments product. The gap
varies across countries. For example, Saudi Arabia and India
have large adoption, usage gaps, and Sweden and the UK show
a much smaller gap.
Further, across all countries, the share of consumer outﬂow
transactions that are non-cash is signiﬁcantly less than the
share of adults who have a payments product (all countries
lie below the equilibrium line, the line on which share of non-
cash transactions is the same as share of adults who own a
payments product). While developed countries like Singa-
pore and Belgium also have a large gap, in several coun-
tries, including emerging countries like UAE and Kenya, people
are hardly using their payments products for non-cash
outﬂows.
The gap between payments adoption and usage also has
implications on where countries fall in the ﬁnancial inclu-
sion progression. Fig. 5 shows the ﬁnancial inclusion
progression of the 30 countries based on usage of payments
products (indexed values). While countries still follow the four
stages of progression based on usage, there are signiﬁcant
shifts in the position that several countries occupy on usage
as compared to adoption.
Six countries move back in the progression.
Kenya: Kenya moves back from Payments Ready to Early
Days. While Kenya has performed well through innovation in
enabling the adoption of payments products (e.g., M-Pesa),
payments products are used for limited ﬂows and have not
signiﬁcantly penetrated large dollar value ﬂows (e.g. at point
of sale [POS], salary disbursements).
UAE: The UAE moves back from Payments Ready to
Transitioning. The UAE has made signiﬁcant progress in en-
abling the adoption of payments products and their usage for
receiving inﬂows through initiatives such as wage protec-
tion for immigrants that mandate usage of salary cards for
receiving salaries.
Singapore, Spain, Japan, and Germany: All these coun-
tries move back from Most Advanced to Payments
Ready despite having all the elements of a modern pay-
ments system. In Germany and Japan, consumers’ prefer-
ence for cash for purchases, driven by a low crime rate and
extensive, inexpensive ATM networks, is hindering the usage
of the payments product. In Spain, the ﬁnancial crisis has
signiﬁcantly hit consumers’ conﬁdence in banks and moved
more people outside the formal economy, driving high cash
usage.
Figure 4 Stages of ﬁnancial inclusion progression based on adoption-2012. Sources: World Bank Findex and Databank, CIA Factbook,
RBR Global Cards Data, MIX, Euromonitor Passport, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook, Swiss RE, Country Statistics Bureaus, Local
Interviews, Advisors Analysis.
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In Singapore, it is an issue of timing. In the MasterCard Ad-
visors Cashless Journey study, Singapore is the fastest-
moving developed market of all countries of the study.
Three countries move forward in the progression.
US: The US moves up from Payments Ready to Most Ad-
vanced. The US has a large unbanked population (8 to 10%
of all adults) (FDIC, 2011), which makes it lag behind other
developed nations on payments adoption. But on usage, the
US has achieved signiﬁcant success in driving usage from
people who have the products; these people also account for
the bulk of dollar ﬂows as ﬁnancial exclusion is concen-
trated at the lower income tiers.
Philippines: The Philippines has moved up from Early Days
to Transitioning. The reason appears to be that the Philip-
pines has made better progress than its peers (based on adop-
tion) in driving the usage of payments products for receiving
inﬂows (e.g., salaries, remittances). A high penetration, trust,
and engagement of banks by the middle class could be some
reasons.
Mexico: Mexico has also moved up from Early Days to
Transitioning. But in this case the reason appears to be that
Mexico has made much better progress than its peers (based
on adoption) in driving the usage of payments products for
outﬂows (e.g., consumer purchases).
Conclusions
Applying these principles will increase the chances of success
of driving higher ﬁnancial inclusion and realising its beneﬁts.
Full ﬁnancial inclusion will still take time to develop but is
more likely to happen with tangible beneﬁts. This study helps
set the strategic direction for the efﬁcient development of
ﬁnancial inclusion in a country. This is just a starting point,
and more work within the framework provided by this study
will need to be done to identify the speciﬁc tactics and
execute them.
Financial sector reforms and ﬁnancial
inclusion in India
Sudha. P. Rao and M.R. Anand*
*Authors are Senior Advisers in the Government of India. Views
expressed are strictly personal.
Financial sector reforms in India were introduced in the
early 1990s, with the objective of improving efﬁciency in the
allocation and pricing of credit by allowing a greater play of
market forces. During the initial years, issues relating to ﬁ-
nancial inclusion did not ﬁnd much prominence in policy. The
Government and multilateral aid agencies began to advo-
cate ﬁnancial inclusion vigorously. The themes of “inclusive
growth” and “ﬁnancial inclusion” came to ﬁgure promi-
nently in the 11th and 12th Five Year Plan documents
(Government of India, 2008, 2013). The idea of inclusive
growth is, however, neither new nor novel (Rao, 2008). An
Figure 5 Stages of ﬁnancial inclusion based on degree of payments usage-2012. Note: Degree of payments usage is a weighted average
of usage for inﬂows and outﬂows that was indexed on a scale of 0 to 5. Sources: World Bank Findex and Databank, CIA Factbook,
RBR Global Cards Data, MIX, Euromonitor Passport, Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook,Swiss RE, Country Statistics Bureaus, Local
Interviews, Advisors Analysis.
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examination of policies in India suggests that the idea of ﬁ-
nancial inclusion had existed in essence, albeit, without the
nomenclature, even before the reforms.
The committee set up under Dr. Rangarajan (Report of the
Committee on Financial Inclusion, 2008) deﬁned ﬁnancial in-
clusion to be a process of ensuring access to ﬁnancial ser-
vices and timely and adequate credit where needed by
vulnerable groups such as weaker sections and low income
groups, at an affordable cost. Financial services have come
to span a range of instruments, organisations, and payment
mechanisms. Apart from regular forms of ﬁnancial interme-
diation, ﬁnancial inclusion may include a basic no-frills bank
account, savings products to suit cash ﬂows of poor house-
holds, money transfer facilities, small loans and insurance,
life and non-life. Information technology (IT) has made it pos-
sible to enable payments and reduce transaction costs. The
direct beneﬁt transfer system based on “Aadhaar” uses IT for
transfer of funds which has made targeting possible. Finan-
cial inclusion has become individual centric as compared to
the sector based approach adopted earlier.
This paper is an attempt to review the changes in policy
since 1991. The outcomes in terms of the spread of ﬁnan-
cial infrastructure, supply and availability of credit to the poor
and to rural areas during 1991–2007 are traced. Next, the
emergence of new organisational forms and new programme
initiatives are examined. Observations on the strengths and
weaknesses of some of the new modalities for ﬁnancial in-
clusion follow.
Financial sector reforms and rural sector
The ﬁrst phase of ﬁnancial sector reforms followed a road map
provided by the Report of the Committee on the Financial
System (1991). The guiding principle was to reduce State in-
tervention in the allocation of credit that endangered the
health and solvency of banks. The Report of the Committee
on Banking Sector Reforms (1998) emphasised that only robust
and vibrant rural ﬁnancial institutions can cope with strin-
gent norms at par with the international structure.
From social banking to efﬁcient banking: In the pre
reform period, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) consciously
played a developmental role by encouraging banks to mobil-
ise savings through deposits and promoting institutions, namely
commercial banks, regional rural banks, and cooperative banks
so that credit through formal sources could be made avail-
able to agriculture, rural areas, small scale industry, and
weaker sections. To ensure supply, the RBI had stipulated that
40% of credit be reserved for the priority sector. The prior-
ity sector got continuously redeﬁned to cover a number of
new activities such as software, food processing, venture
capital, housing, construction and repair. This gave banks a
wide and proﬁtable choice of activities and facilitated easier
compliance with priority sector obligations; however, they
were inconsistent with the original idea of the priority sector.
From 1995 to 1996, banks with a shortfall in lending to pri-
ority sector were allowed to contribute to the Rural Infra-
structure Development Fund established of the National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD). Lending
rates were gradually freed, except for interest rates on export
credit and small direct loans up to 2 lakh rupees.
Impact of banking reforms on rural sector
The increase in outreach of the formal sector institutions in
rural areas, especially after nationalisation of banks in 1969,
is well known. From 1977 to 1990, the RBI required commer-
cial banks to open four branches in unbanked locations to
qualify for opening a branch in an already banked location.
In 1991, this requirement was repealed. Through the reforms,
banks began to close down unviable branches. There was a
decline in relative terms and in absolute terms as the number
of rural branches declined from 35 206 in 1991 to 30 236 in
2007 (RBI, 2009a).
Deposit and credit accounts: During the reform period,
there was a sharp slowdown in deposit mobilisation in rural
and semi urban areas. On the other hand, there was a marked
increase in the share of the metros which came to account
for 56% of the deposits (by amount) in 2012 compared to only
39.4% in 1991. In case of credit, even the absolute number
of rural credit accounts declined from 32.4 million in 1991
to 25.6 million in 2004 after which there has been a re-
prieve (RBI, 2009a). The credit deposit ratio showed a per-
sistent decline from 60% in 1991 to 51.6% in 2005 in rural areas.
Decline in the share of credit to agriculture: In conso-
nance with the trends of rural credit, the share of agricul-
ture in outstanding credit of scheduled commercial banks also
declined from 15% of the gross bank credit in 1991–1992 to
10% in 2000–2001, after which it has shown a marginal in-
crease to 11.3% in 2007–2008.2 There was also a qualitative
change in lending to agriculture away from direct ﬁnance. The
cooperative banks had faced problems even before the
reforms. During and post reforms, the positioning of coop-
erative banks in the ﬁnancial system remains unclear.
The withdrawal of formal banking had an impact on the
source of credit to cultivator households. The share of insti-
tutional sources for cultivator households, such as commer-
cial banks and cooperative banks that had increased from 7.3%
in 1951 to 66.3% in 1991, declined to 61% in 2002 (NSSO, 2006).
In effect, the reorientation of the formal credit system had
the impact of negating the beneﬁts of the expansion of the
credit infrastructure over the previous decades. The rural
poor, particularly the small and marginal farmers, began to
be further marginalised and the reforms appear to have re-
sulted in driving the poor again into the clutches of the money
lender. The non-availability of credit, adding to the risks of
price and technology, accentuated the problem and contrib-
uted to a larger socioeconomic malaise in rural India. The slow-
down in the coverage of formal credit institutions led to a
rise in indebtedness. According to the All India Debt and In-
vestment Survey (NSSO, 2006), the relative share of institu-
tional sources in total cash debt of rural households which
had risen from 7.1% in 1951–1952 to 61.2% in 1981 increased
further to 64% in 1991 but declined to 57% in 2002. The gradual
shrinkage of formal credit institutions in rural areas caused
the increasing dominance of private players in the credit
market.
From policy drift to a policy stance: Through the 1990s
until 2007, there was a withdrawal of the formal banking
system, particularly from the rural areas. The distress of the
rural and agriculture sector may be gauged from over 1.83
lakh suicides by farmers reported between 1997 and 2007 due
to indebtedness (Sainath, 2009). By 2003–2004, the need to
refocus on increasing credit to agriculture and rural areas and
other vulnerable sections started to get recognised. The
2 Computed from RBI: Basic Statistical Returns, Various issues.
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Finance Minister announced in the budget speech (July 2003)
a reduction in the lending rate for agriculture. The Indian
Banks Association advised public sector banks to reduce their
rate to a single digit of not more than 9% on crop loans up
to a ceiling of Rs.50 000. The Government of India an-
nounced a package for doubling the credit ﬂow to agricul-
ture in three years (Government of India, 2004). From 2007,
the number of bank branches in rural areas increased to reach
39 718 in 2013 (RBI, 2014c). The number of loans in rural and
semi urban areas and rural deposits started to increase. But
the share of rural and semi urban areas in bank credit con-
tinued to decline in contrast to rise in credit ﬂowing to the
metros. In 2008, an agriculture debt waiver was announced
under which farmers whose loans were written off by lending
institutions under the scheme became eligible for fresh ﬁnance
from lending institutions.
Financial inclusion: the new focus
The 11th Five Year Plan (2007–2012) had already reﬂected
the concern that outcomes resulting from reforms were in-
iquitous, especially for rural and agriculture sectors. After
one and half decades of reforms, a Committee under the
Chairmanship of Dr. C Rangarajan was appointed to suggest
measures for ﬁnancial inclusion. Meanwhile, new institu-
tional and organisational forms such as self help groups (SHG)
and micro ﬁnance institutions (MFI) had emerged.
SHG-Bank linkage: NABARD launched the SHG Bank Linkage
Programme (SHGBLP) in 1992 to organise the rural poor into
SHGs and build their capacities to manage ﬁnances. In 1996,
RBI advised banks to treat lending to SHGs as a normal lending
activity. Consequently, loans could be extended to SHGs for
all purposes, About 85% of the groups were formed exclu-
sively by women (RBI, 2005). Working through SHGs came to
be adopted in other government programmes. From 1999,
SHGs were provided a combination of credit and subsidy to
undertake a cluster of activities at the Block level under the
Swaranajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY) and this has
been continued as the National Rural Livelihoods Mission
(NRLM). (Sources for the sub sections SHG-Bank linkage and
Micro ﬁnance institutions include NCAER, 2008; NABARD,
2012.)
Micro ﬁnance institutions: MFIs are bodies registered as
trusts, societies, and companies. In 2000–2001, the Micro
Finance Development Fund (MFDF) with a corpus of Rs.100
crore was established in NABARD and later re-designated as
the Micro Finance Development and Equity Fund in 2005–
2006 with an additional corpus of Rs. 200 crore for scaling-
up of SHGBLPs, and reﬁnance and capital support to MFIs. The
initial contribution for setting up MFIs has come from public
funds. The Government allowed external commercial bor-
rowing to MFIs/NGOs engaged in micro ﬁnance in 2005 up to
USD 5 million per year and raised it to USD 10 million in 2011.
The MFIs have come to be used by private banks to fulﬁl pri-
ority sector targets; MFIs lend to individuals and to SHGs. The
micro credit organisations have moved into areas with well
developed rural and banking infrastructure. The southern
region has a high proportion of SHGs and MFIs. Ghate (2007)
found that half the SHG members and 30% of MFI borrowers
were below the poverty line.
The RBI did not place any ceiling on interest rates until
2011. Commercial banks do not, as a practice, collect infor-
mation on interest rates of MFIs/SHGs. In the absence of
regulations, MFIs negotiated interest rates with clients and
SHGs with borrowing members. Hence, information on in-
terest rates is based on whatever is disclosed by lending
bodies. The “Lights and Shades” study shows that the inter-
est rate charged by SHGs was over 24% and the repayment
period between 3 and 6 months; SHGs also lend to non
members (EDA and APMAS, 2006). The MFI, SKS Microﬁnance
charged 28.3% per annum in 2010 (Economist, 2010). Bandhan
provided loans at 22% in 2014 (Rajashekhar & Ray, 2014).
Insurance has become an ancillary activity of microﬁnance.
Many MFIs offer life insurance products tagged with loans. A
form of inter-linkage of credit with insurance has come to
be followed, resulting in high cost and has also tied credit
to the borrower. The Indian microﬁnance sector has been
reported by JP Morgan to be among the most leveraged in
the world with debt-equity ratio of 7.2 in contrast to a global
average of 3.3 (CGAP et al., 2012). The commercial success
of MFIs has attracted private capital and enabled SKS
Microﬁnance to go in for an IPO. Micro ﬁnance institutions
require little physical investment for business. But there is
no reliable source of data even on the numbers operating in
the country. The number of MFIs reporting to Sa-Dhan, an
industry body, was 264 in 2010, 170 in 2011 and 167 in 2012
(Access, 2013, p. 48). This was an indication of the churning
taking place in the sector.
The high rate of interest charged by MFIs along with their
coercive practices in lending and recovery created a crisis,
and by 2010, more than 200 suicides by borrowers from MFIs
in Andhra Pradesh were reported (Kinetz, 2012). The State
government promulgated the AP Micro Finance Institutions
(Regulation of Moneylending) 2010 Ordinance (later, the
Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions [Regulation of Money
Lending] Act), which required all MFIs to register and pro-
hibited loan collectors from visiting people’s homes. The MFIs
had to move to a monthly repayment cycle from a weekly,
with repayment monitored by the State government. The RBI
set up a committee which submitted its report in 2011
(Malegam Committee Report). The RBI brought MFIs under its
supervision in December 2011, and stipulated that there would
be only three components in the pricing of loans—an Inter-
est rate cap of 26%—on reducing balance; processing
charge—1% of loan amount; and insurance premium.
In addition, a maximum of two MFIs could lend to the same
household. For loans from banks to non-banking ﬁnancial com-
panies (NBFCs) to be considered part of the priority sector,
the RBI speciﬁed the quantum of household annual income
at Rs. 60 000 in rural areas and Rs. 1.2 lakhs in non rural areas
and also loan limits of Rs. 35 000 in the ﬁrst cycle and Rs.
50 000 in subsequent cycles. In February 2014, the RBI revised
the formula for pricing of credit by NBFC-MFIs, declaring that
the ceiling on interest rate would be the average base rate
of the largest ﬁve commercial banks by assets multiplied by
2.75, applicable from April 2014 (RBI, 2014d). The Govern-
ment sought to make RBI the regulator in the sector by in-
troducing a bill. The Parliamentary Standing Committee,
however, returned the bill and suggested the constitution of
a uniﬁed and independent regulator for the entire micro
ﬁnance sector, with representatives from all agencies and in-
stitutions such as RBI, NABARD, Small Industries Develop-
ment Bank of India (SIDBI), the Central Government and the
MFIs. At present, the MFI sector continues to function without
any central regulation, which is a matter of concern.
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New payment mechanisms and unique identity: A major
innovation that has taken place is the use of digital and tele-
communication technologies for transfer and remittance of
money. Under the Direct Cash Transfer programme intro-
duced in the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017), beneﬁts
under a range of social sector programmes were envisaged
to be transferred to accounts of beneﬁciaries, electroni-
cally minimising the tiers involved in fund ﬂow and reduc-
ing delays and leakages. The Direct Beneﬁt programme uses
the Unique Identity called Aadhaar, a 12 digit id-number issued
to individuals by the Unique Identiﬁcation Authority of India
to identify beneﬁciaries.
The Jan Dhan initiative: The Government of India, in
August 2014, introduced a national ﬁnancial inclusion
programme named “Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana”3
(Government of India, 2014). The programme is being imple-
mented in mission mode with the target of providing bank ac-
counts to at least 75 million people by January 26, 2015. Since
the target was achieved in November 2014, the target was
re-ﬁxed at 10 million accounts. Under Jan Dhan Yojana, a
person from an unbanked household who opens an account
(maximum balance Rs. 50 000) is given a RuPay debit card,
a Rs.1 lakh accident insurance cover and an additional Rs.
30 000 life insurance cover, and a credit limit of Rs. 5000.
To get the beneﬁt of accident insurance cover, the RuPay Debit
Card has to be used at least once every 45 days. The rapid
pace at which the accounts have been opened is also an in-
dicator of the latent demand for bank accounts that re-
mained unmet so far. The simpliﬁcation of the process and
active outreach programme has provided an impetus towards
ﬁnancial inclusion.
The programme was introduced in two phases. In the ﬁrst
phase, until April 2015, bank accounts were opened on a large
scale. In the second phase, the effort has included extend-
ing direct transfer of subsidies and the introduction of insur-
ance and pension products. As far as opening bank accounts
is concerned, Jan Dhan Yojana has been a success. (The Jan
Dhan Yojana was recognised in the Guinness Book for achiev-
ing the maximum number of bank accounts [18.1 million] in
just one week.) By April 2015, 144.3 million bank accounts
were opened and by August 2015, 175.7 million accounts were
opened. However, the average balance, at Rs. 1182, is just
over the minimum required for a savings account (Rs. 1000)
and about 46% of accounts have zero balance.
The Economic Survey of 2014–2015 recommended that the
JAM Trinity comprising Jan Dhan Yojana, Aadhaar and Mobile
numbers should be linked for transfer of subsidies to in-
tended beneﬁciaries. In May 2015, two insurance schemes
were launched, called Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana
and Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana, to provide in-
surance cover in the event of death by any cause or disabil-
ity due to accident. Again, these schemes are linked to a bank
account.
The rapid pace at which accounts have been opened is a
clear indicator of the latent demand for bank accounts. The
simpliﬁcation of processes and the active outreach pro-
gramme have indeed provided an impetus towards ﬁnancial
inclusion. While these initiatives have made a bank account
central for ﬁnancial inclusion, a bank account by itself is no
guarantee of having regular ﬁnancial transactions, for which
one needs access to bank infrastructure and a steady stream
of income. There is also a need to ensure that back end con-
nectivity exists for Aadhaar based identiﬁcation to work.
Business facilitators and correspondents: In 2006, the RBI
permitted banks to make use of services of NGOs, SHGs, MFIs
and civil society organisations and other speciﬁed individu-
als (e.g. ex-servicemen) to function as business facilitators
and correspondents. In June 2014, RBI relaxed conditions for
banks to engage MFIs as business correspondents. This fol-
lowed from the Nachiket Mor Committee on accelerating the
ﬂow of funds to the bottom of the pyramid and enlarging the
catchment area of business correspondents. Using the guide-
lines, private banks themselves started to lend at 22% to 26%
close to ceiling rates applicable to MFIs (Ray, 2014).
New banks, small banks and payment banks: The RBI
decided to allow new banks to be set up in 2013 with a view
to extend the geographic coverage of banks and improve
access to banking services. After scrutinising 25 applica-
tions, two entities were given in-principle approval. In No-
vember 2014, RBI brought out notiﬁcations on two new
categories of banks, namely, small banks and payment banks
and invited applications (RBI, 2014a, RBI, 2014b). This also
followed from the Nachiket Mor Committee, which recom-
mended differentiated entities as compared to the earlier
system of having universal banks.
Conclusion
The sequence of interventions and experience in India in the
arena of ﬁnancial inclusion gives valuable insights and can
guide future policy. Financial inclusion cannot be taken for
granted since ﬁnancial institutions when left to themselves
will prefer proﬁtable market segments. Even with the entry
of MFIs, NGOs and SHGs in rural credit, interest rates con-
tinue to be high. High interest rates have been justiﬁed as
reﬂecting transaction costs and the cost of ﬁnance. However,
with rural credit markets remaining fragmented, high inter-
est rates may well reﬂect risks and costs (unrelated to bor-
rowers) that may have simply been passed on. There is a lack
of transparency and information on what the MFIs are charg-
ing, even as their ﬁnancing, at least in part, is from the
banking system. A single point regulator with a mechanism
for monitoring activities of lending entities with regular data
collected on interest rates and loan tenure needs to be put
in place.
Micro ﬁnance has provided a way of increasing the out-
reach at grass root level with the ability to recycle re-
sources through better recovery rates. But to expect informal
and semi-formal intermediaries to deliver on the formi-
dable task of achieving ﬁnancial inclusion, without the back-
bone of a formal network of banks, is a recipe for ﬁnancial
fragmentation and losing the advantage of risk pooling. The
spread of formal banking is necessary not only to serve as a
backbone around which the new institutions could grow, but
also to act as a counterweight to informal intermediaries so
that they remain under pressure to keep margins in check.
The formal sector will need to remain and should not be
allowed to withdraw to serve only the metros. In that sense,
the recent initiative under the Jan Dhan Yojana is welcome.
For efforts towards greater ﬁnancial inclusion to be mean-
ingful, credit should support real sector activity which is linked
to livelihoods and income generation. On the latter issue, it3 www.pmjdy/gov.in/scheme_details.
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has been argued that ﬁnancial exclusion is also caused by
demand side factors in the real sector. The supply of ﬁnan-
cial services by themselves cannot assure inclusion unless the
poor have livelihoods that enable them to access these ser-
vices. Unless steps are taken to deal with such constraints,
mere supply side solutions of pushing credit will not work.
The continuing gaps in the delivery systems in supporting
income generating activities for the poor require resurrect-
ing a developmental ﬁnancing approach with ﬁnancial ser-
vices being just one important component integrated with
other services using newer technologies and not just of de-
livering ﬁnancial services on a standalone basis.
A related issue pertains to the creation of new
organisations, instead of building on the strengths of exist-
ing institutions. It may be prudent to strengthen existing struc-
tures, including those in the public sector even as new entrants
are allowed. Another pertinent point to note is that foreign
funding to MFIs for lending to poor has not been allowed in
many countries. In this context, an important difference that
marks the Indian ﬁnancial sector today is the greater open-
ness to external capital. The increasing openness and de-
pendence of MFIs on external capital, including private equity,
imply that ﬂows will depend on interest rate differentials with
attendant risk of reversals due to changes in conditions in the
home country or from market sentiments which are some-
thing that need to be guarded against. Finally, if the process
of ﬁnancial inclusion is to be sustainable, increase in access
to ﬁnancial services needs to be accompanied by trust, com-
pliance to standards, and sound ﬁnancial regulation since ﬁ-
nancial inclusion cannot proceed without ﬁnancial stability.
Voluntary participation and access to ﬁnance:
a South African view
Philip Kostov, University of Central Lancashire;
Thankom Arun, University of Central Lancashire;
Samuel Annim, University of Cape Coast, Ghana;
and Charles Adjasi, University of Stellenbosch,
South Africa
There is a long standing consensus that ﬁnancial systems and
structures are beneﬁcial to growth. The development of an
improved access ﬁnancial system is deemed important in
contributing to growth and poverty alleviation (Beck &
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & Levine, 2007).
Financial inclusion is hence an important objective of a well-
functioning ﬁnancial system. In the developing world and in
Africa in particular, the importance of ﬁnancial develop-
ment is crucial, given the growth and development needs of
these economies. Traditionally, empirical studies investigat-
ing the ﬁnancial development relationship to growth have fo-
cussed on ﬁnancial depth. This fact conforms to an implicit
assumption of universality and to some extent, uniformity of
ﬁnancial systems in terms of their functions. Focussing on ﬁ-
nancial depth essentially assumes that all ﬁnancial systems
work in the same way (i.e. possess the same functions) and
the overall (growth inducing) impact is simply a measure of
magnitude, a magnitude that can be directly related to a
measure of the development of the relevant ﬁnancial systems.
More recently, analytical attention has turned to the issues
of ﬁnancial outreach and inclusion, referred to as access to
ﬁnance. This is an important conceptual shift with far-
reaching consequences.
And yet the standard view of improving access to ﬁnance
has been through the removal of supply-side constraints. This
kind of logic postulates that “those who have access, but
choose not to use services pose less of a problem for
policymakers” (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2008). Relaxing the
supply-side barriers would, however, bring the potential lack
of demand for ﬁnancial services to the forefront with impor-
tant policy implications. Coordinated policy interventions de-
signed to expand access to ﬁnance are costly and such costs
will need to be compared to the potential beneﬁts. When the
barriers to access are removed, voluntary non-participation
reduces these beneﬁts. We review the situation in South Africa
and conclude that taking voluntary participation into account
is essential if improved access to ﬁnance is sought and is
desirable.
Financial sector in South Africa
South Africa has a relatively well developed economy com-
pared to the rest of Africa; the value of economic activity is
fairly high with GDP at US$ 1870 billion in 2010. Further-
more, the ﬁnancial system in South Africa is also quite well
developed, with the assets of ﬁnancial intermediaries being
as much as 252% of GDP in 2010 (see Table 1). Bank assets
are the main drivers of the sector, making up nearly half of
economic activity or GDP. Financial institutions accounted for
39% of the formal employment and contributed 15.3% of the
total corporate tax in 2010. This bears evidence to a fairly
large and vibrant sector. Equally noticeable is the growth in
the assets of the ﬁnancial intermediaries since 2000. Thus,
the ﬁnancial landscape has seen some rapid transformation
over the period and is worth examining. Another important
aspect of the system is the presence and contribution of the
insurance sector and pension fund industry. The combined
assets of the long term insurance sector and pension funds
were close to that of banks in 2010. This is a good develop-
ment for long term savings. The size and depth of the stock
market activity in the sector are also substantial and more
than twice the size of economic activity (278%).
Table 1 Selected ﬁnancial sector indicators.
Jun 2000 Jun 2010 Relative
size 2010
Share of GDP 68.6 203.8 10.5%
Size 1880 6050 252%
Assets of banks 730 3040 127%
Long term insurers* 630 1440 60%
Short term insurers 50 90 4%
Pension funds 470 1480 62%
Share of formal employment
Employment** 286000 356353 39%
Source: South African Reserve Bank (2012).
*The long-term insurer assets ﬁgure includes assets of pension
funds managed by an insurance company.
**Financial intermediation, insurance, pension funding and aux-
iliary services.
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While one notices the commendable economic and ﬁnan-
cial structure of South Africa, it is also important to note that
33% of South Africans live in the rural areas (locations with
little access to basic social and economic infrastructure), 54%
are dependent on others for their income, and 31.3% live
below the poverty line of $2 per day (World Bank, 2012). This
shows a ﬁnancial system with insufﬁcient ﬁnancial reach and
inclusion. Hence focussing too much on the ﬁnancial depth
could be misleading.
Developments in South African ﬁnancial market
By 2003, South Africa had 58 banks (41 domestic, 2 mutual
banks and 15 branches of international banks). Currently this
number has reduced to 30 banks consisting of 11 local banks,
2 mutual banks, 5 foreign banks and 12 branches of interna-
tional banks in South Africa. The banking sector in South Africa
is dominated by four main banks, Absa bank (recently ac-
quired by Barclays), FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank (which
has recently had signiﬁcant share acquisition by China’s In-
dustrial Development Bank), which together control a little
over 80% of total market share. The Gini and Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) (Table 2) indicators also conﬁrm the
strong hold of the Big Four banks in the industry and are in-
dicative of a structure that leans towards a monopolistic situ-
ation, with market power concentrated in the hands of the
four major banks. In such situations, banks are likely to charge
high fees and earn high proﬁts. Indeed, banking in South Africa
is proﬁtable as the magnitude and trends in return on equity
(ROE) and interest margins indicate (Table 2). How does this
affect the structure of the banking industry in South Africa?
Empirical studies into the structure of the banking system
in South Africa show the presence of a monopolistic struc-
ture, which has been gradually evolving towards competi-
tive market structure. These studies have largely used the
Panzar-Rosse H statistic (between 0 and 13), a measure of
market structure typically estimated to gauge whether markets
are monopolistic or competitive. In the immediate post-
Apartheid era (1994–2001), the structure of the system was
largely monopolistic with an H-stat of 0.81 (Claessens &
Laeven, 2004). Studies on latter periods like that of Bikker,
Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2009) and Kupukile and Ncube (2011),
however, show that this monopolistic structure had shifted
substantially, though the new structure is not necessarily very
competitive. The study by Kupukile and Ncube (2011) posits
a trend which is more in the nature of monopolistic compe-
tition in structure. There has been a reduction in the level
of concentration in the market and competition is indeed
present in the South African banking system, albeit limited
to the big four banks.
The depth of the banking system in South Africa has been
growing over the years and is comparable to that of other
emerging countries such as Brazil and India. The banking
system provides substantial credit to the economy, with the
amount of domestic credit extension exceeding GDP. For in-
stance, South African banks’ domestic credit to GDP was 182%
in 2010, much higher than that of India (71%), Brazil (97%),
and a little higher than China (146%) (Mlambo and Ncube,
2011). Such high levels of credit extension are important in
driving economic activity, especially when the credit is ex-
tended towards private sector activity. In this respect, the
banks in South Africa are able to meet signiﬁcant ﬁnancing
needs of ﬁrm activity in South Africa. This is especially useful
for an emerging country where ﬁrms would be engaged in
capital expansion projects and would require greater access
to bank ﬁnance.
Access to ﬁnance
Despite the sophisticated level of the banking system, there
are gaps when one observes the level of access to banking
and banking products in South Africa—an indication of skewed
intermediation and/or substantial ﬁnancial exclusion. The
number of commercial banks per 100 000 adults is quite low
at 10.1 in 2010. Though this is a signiﬁcant increase from the
2004 level of 4.8, it is still low when compared to other emerg-
ing countries. For instance, in 2008 South Africa had 7.9 bank
branches per 100 000 adults whilst that for India was 10.13
and Brazil had 13.5 bank branches per 100 000 adults.
Similarly,the number of ATMs per 100 000 adults, though, has
more than doubled from 24.9 in 2004 to 59.58 in 2010 and is
also low. Again, compared to other emerging economy
markets, while South Africa had 44 ATMS per 100 000 adults
in 2008, Brazil had 112 ATMs per 1000 adults in the same year.
This is further indicative of low ﬁnancial access (World Bank,
2012).
South Africa appears to do much better than Brazil and
India on the number of bank borrowers and depositors per 1000
adults (South Africa—borrowers per 1000 adults: 340.71 in 2004
and 414.67 in 2010; depositors per 1000 adults: 383.51 in 2004
and 978.4 in 2010). Certainly, population could play a role
in this, given that the respective populations of Brazil and
India are at least four times that of South Africa. What is sig-
niﬁcantly interesting to observe is the gap between borrow-
ers and depositors. The proportion of bank borrowers in South
Africa is less than half the number of depositors. This could
be a sign of various obstacles to accessing ﬁnancial ser-
vices. Borrowers may be seeing higher costs and transaction
fees from banks and may therefore be shying away from bor-
rowing. This trend can easily arise in situations where a few
Table 2 Structure of banking industry.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Gini 82.9 83.2 83 83.1 83.4 84 83.6
HHI 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
Market share of top 4 banks 80.9 83.6 83.8 84.1 85.1 84.4 84.6
ROE 11.6 16.2 15.2 18.3 18.1 28.7 15.8
Interest margin/gross income 38.3 41.6 38.2 43.9 58.5 44.6 49.5
HHI: Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index; ROE: return on equity.
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banks dominate the market and may compete for deposits
using innovative products but not necessarily extend cheaper
loans. The nature of competition in the South African banking
industry appears to favour high proﬁts, high fees and charges,
and not so much the widening of ﬁnancial services to the lower
income earners. Thus, competition in the industry is biased
towards the middle to upper income segment of the market
and is based onmore of product and service innovation or com-
petition rather than price competition as is typical of ﬁrms
in an industry characterised by monopolistic competition.
Recent trends in banking in South Africa, however, show
a growing competition for banking customers, particularly in
the lower income segment of the market. Microﬁnance banks
such as Capitec and Africa Bank are doing extremely well in
attracting the lower incomemarket. Anecdotal evidence shows
that Capitec may be competing with the Big Four banks on
some lower middle income earners in South Africa. Teba Bank,
which has traditionally concentrated its banking services to
the mine worker population in South Africa, was recently
rebranded and re-launched as Ubank in 2010 with a major ob-
jective of broadening its clientele base beyond the
mineworkers.
Policy developments
The ﬁnancial sector in South Africa has witnessed signiﬁ-
cant policy developments (besides the initial general
liberalisation reforms to integrate the economy into the global
ﬁnancial system following independence in 1994). Some of
the policy initiatives include the Financial Services Charter
(FSC), the National Credit Act and the recently promul-
gated Consumer Protection Act. Together, these policies have
shaped and directed the evolution of the ﬁnancial system land-
scape in South Africa.
The FSC of 2003 came out of voluntary agreement between
the Big Four banks, and the government to assist in deepen-
ing ﬁnancial intermediation and increasing access in South
Africa. Even though the ﬁnancial sector was highly devel-
oped and was extending credit substantially, there was a gap
in credit extension and ﬁnancial intermediation. This gap was
the result of the low ﬁnancial access and high level of ﬁnan-
cial exclusion of a substantial proportion of South Africans
(mostly the poor and predominantly black populace). The FSC
was designed for the provision of development ﬁnance and
speciﬁcally aimed at ﬁnancing infrastructure development and
rural development (social and economic amenities), small busi-
nesses, and to help bridge the housing gap by ﬁnancing housing
for low income earners with a monthly income of between
R1500 to R7500. The initial agreements had commitments
made by the Big Four to provide over R70 billion in develop-
ment ﬁnance from 2003 to 2008, of which R42 billion would
be to ﬁnance housing of low income individuals, R25 billion
towards infrastructure ﬁnance, R5 billion for small business
ﬁnance, and Rs1.5 billion to ﬁnance rural development
(Bankable Frontiers Associates, 2009; CGAP, 2012).
As a way of showing their level of commitment to the FSC
course, South Africa’s four banks teamed up with Postbank,
a state-owned ﬁnancial institution and other ﬁnancial market
players in 2004, to launch a banking product (Mzansi) spe-
ciﬁcally aimed at low-end consumers, who had no access to
banking. The Mzansi account (a common brand) offers an ATM
card and basic, but limited, bank functionality at lower and
affordable cost to the consumer.
The Mzansi initiative was a success, making some signiﬁ-
cant impacts in access to ﬁnance in South Africa. About six
million South Africans had opened a Mzansi account by De-
cember 2008 (Bankable Frontiers Associates, 2009). The
banking sector could offer ﬁnancial services to the previ-
ously unbanked through the Mzansi account and thus in-
creased the level of intermediation in the ﬁnancial sector.
Close to 80% of South Africans now have transactional banking
services as a result of the Mzansi account. However, recent
reports show that the Mzansi success story may be slowing
down or fading away. Though six million accounts were
opened, it appears that fewer than that number continue to
exist in the bank books. Only about 3.5 million Mzansi ac-
counts existed on bank books by 2008 (FinMark Trust, 2011).
While there has been an upward trend in the number of
account holders (from 2.5 million accounts in 2007, the ﬁgures
had risen to a little over 4.5 million Mzansi accounts by 2010),
about 33% of the Mzansi accounts are dormant. Further, there
is an increasing number of inactive accounts noticeable from
2007 onwards. It appears that there are considerable psy-
chological barriers to the uptake and usage of Mzansi (Kostov,
Arun, & Annim, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Nonetheless, the Mzansi
initiative has helped widen ﬁnancial access to an extent in
South Africa. A report by Bankable Frontier Associate (2009)
notes that while there may appear to be a slow-down in the
zeal and tempo of Mzansi, it has created an important signal
on the usefulness of being innovative and creative in extend-
ing ﬁnancial services to the previously unbanked. Another
major policy change is the National Credit Act, introduced
in 2007. The Act is meant to improve opportunities for asset
accumulation for previously disadvantaged South Africans by
1) improving access to ﬁnance, 2) reducing the cost of ﬁnance,
and 3) increasing the levels of protection available to
consumers.
Other acts to improve ﬁnancial services and protect con-
sumers have been the Financial Advisory and Intermediaries
Services Act (2002) and the Financial Services Ombuds Schemes
Act (2004). A more recent act is the Consumer Protection Act,
2008 (Act No. 68 of 2008), which came into effect on 1 April
2011. The act is primarily aimed at promoting a fair, acces-
sible, and sustainable marketplace for consumer products and
services. Furthermore, the Financial Sector Code based on
the Financial Sector Charter and which seeks to align the FSC
with the Codes of Good Practice for black economic empow-
erment was gazetted for public comments in December 2010.
Conclusion
In South Africa, irrespective of signiﬁcant policy initiatives
in the ﬁnancial sector, the ﬁnancial exclusion (the percent-
age of adults who have no access to products/services from
either the formal or informal sectors) increased from 23.4%
(7 816 691 adults) in 2010 to 27% (9 096 492 adults) in 2011
(FinMark Trust, 2011). FinMark Trust (2011) points out that
South African banks are perceived to be charging high fees
for transactions and concurrently, awareness and usage of the
Mzansi account have decreased. These two tendencies seem
contradictory. While the banks are committed in principle to
initiatives such as the FSC and the Mzansi account, the nature
of the industry (monopolistic competition) would preclude
them from being competitive on price (fees) and rather, and
favour competition on product types and lines. In this regard,
numerous innovative products and services would evolve
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rapidly from the Big Four banks, but this does not necessar-
ily occur either at low cost or with low cost versions which
will increase access and ﬁnancial inclusion. Indeed, even in
the event of the existence of relatively cheaper products like
the Mzansi account, there could be a behavioural lethargy
towards new and emerging ﬁnancial institutions due to the
perceived high cost nature of ﬁnancial services in South Africa.
As a matter of consequence, some existing holders of prod-
ucts like the Mzansi account could also be affected by these
perceptions and become increasingly dormant as is noticed
from the trend in the dormancy level of Mzansi account
holders. All this strongly suggests that the behavioural con-
straints on access to ﬁnance are increasingly important and
deserve careful reconsideration.
Financially excluded in the “Lucky Country”:
lessons from under-banked Australia
Vinita Godinho, Supriya Singh and Roslyn Russell,
RMIT University, Australia
Access to ﬁnancial services facilitates economic growth and
reduces income inequality, and is critical to development
(Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). Inclusive ﬁnancial systems
allow people, particularly those on lower incomes, to smooth
their consumption and insure themselves against vulnerabili-
ties. Effective ﬁnancial access also enables people to save and
to borrow small amounts more often, allowing them to build
assets, invest in education and entrepreneurial ventures, and
improve their livelihoods (Collins, Morduch, Rutherford, &
Ruthven, 2009). Inclusive ﬁnance is especially likely to beneﬁt
disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, those from
marginalised communities and those living in remote/rural
locations. Financial inclusion has therefore gained promi-
nence in recent years as a policy objective to improve the
lives of the poor.
Globally, almost 2.5 billion adults have no formal account
with a ﬁnancial institution or are un-banked, and most of them
live in developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012).
This study ﬁnds signiﬁcant gaps in access to ﬁnance—people
in high-income economies are twice as likely to be banked
(89%) as in developing economies. Gaps also emerge in account
usage between demographic groups, particularly in devel-
oping economies. Men are more likely to have an account (46%)
than women (37%), and those in the highest-income quintile
are more than twice as likely to have access than those in
the lowest quintile. Australia, with 99.1% of its adult popu-
lation banked, ranks among the most ﬁnancially included
economies in the world, even in comparison to other high-
income economies (average 89.4% banked). However, do-
mestic research highlights that nearly 17% of Australian adults
are under-banked, and lack access to the mainstream ﬁnan-
cial system (Connolly, 2014).
Financial exclusion in Australia
While most Australians have a formal account with a ﬁnan-
cial institution, under-banked adults are unable to access safe,
affordable, and appropriate ﬁnancial services, particularly ef-
fective credit and insurance (Connolly, 2014). Indigenous
people are over-represented among ﬁnancially excluded
Australians, as are those from non-English speaking back-
grounds, the young, the elderly, single women with depen-
dent children and the “working poor” (Connolly, Georgouras,
& Hems, 2012). Under-banked Australians rely on the infor-
mal or fringe sector, including payday lenders, rent-to-buy
operators or money lenders, for their daily ﬁnancial needs
(Connolly & Hajaj, 2001). This is similar to the one in ﬁve (20%)
households in the United States (US) who also use alterna-
tive ﬁnancial services (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
2014).
Similar to Australia, community groups in the US and other
developed countries which are disproportionately likely to be
excluded, include those from culturally, ethnically or lin-
guistically diverse backgrounds, and the young. Under-
banked Australians also share socio-economic and demographic
characteristics in common with un-banked populations in de-
veloping countries, including geographic exclusion due to re-
moteness, and lower education, literacy/numeracy skills,
employment, income, savings and wealth status (Connolly,
2014).
In developing countries with large un-banked popula-
tions, research is leading the way to evidence-based policy
(Samarajiva, 2011). Policymakers, central bankers and regu-
lators recognise the important role they play in creating con-
ditions to promote ﬁnancial inclusion, and unlock the economic
potential of their populations (Singh, 2013). In Australia,
however, ﬁnancial inclusion is not yet enshrined in regula-
tory or policy frameworks. Instead, it is recognised as a “shared
responsibility” across multiple sectors, including the ﬁnan-
cial services industry, the government, the community, and
academia. Public policy has focussed on improving ﬁnancial
literacy and consumer education (Australian Securities and
Investment Commission, 2014). A broader focus on ﬁnancial
exclusion and the needs of the under-banked has come from
industry, social and consumer researchers.
Longitudinal studies measuring national ﬁnancial exclu-
sion (Connolly, 2014) and ﬁnancial capability among the adult
population (The Social Research Centre, 2011) have been
funded by banks. However, further studies exploring the needs
of under-banked groups among the population, and longer-
term consumer behaviour are needed (Australian Securities
and Investment Commission, 2014). Technology-led models
for rapidly scaling ﬁnancial inclusion have not yet been fully
explored, and there is little research on the design of user-
centred ﬁnancial products and services which better meet the
needs of the under-banked (Godinho & Singh, 2013). Sustain-
able access to ﬁnancial services also remains a challenge for
remote Indigenous communities.
Indigenous ﬁnancial exclusion and policy challenges
Indigenous people living in remote communities are among
the most socio-economically marginalised Australians—they
have lower literacy/numeracy skills, lower employment,
income and savings outcomes, and poorer health, when com-
pared to national averages (Productivity Commission, 2014).
Cultural barriers including language difﬁculties exacerbate
this disadvantage (National Indigenous Money Management
Agenda, 2007). A growing digital divide between urban and
rural/remote Australia and a lack of banking infrastructure
in remote communities also disproportionately disadvan-
tages Indigenous people (Department of Broadband
Communications and the Digital Economy, 2012). Lower access
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and usage of information and communications technology (ICT)
combined with lower digital literacy further restrict Indig-
enous ﬁnancial inclusion by limiting their ability to access elec-
tronic banking delivery channels (National Indigenous Money
Management Agenda, 2007).
Mainstream banks lack information about Indigenous con-
sumers, including an awareness of their cultural needs. In-
digenous people lack conﬁdence in banks, and may prefer to
deal face to face with informal service providers, despite in-
curring higher costs (McDonnell, 2003). Although Indigenous
people comprise 43.1% of the under-banked (Table 3) in Aus-
tralia, there is little academic focus on Indigenous people and
ﬁnances (Gerrans, Clark-Murphy, & Truscott, 2009). Studies
have measured the “gaps” in Indigenous ﬁnancial knowl-
edge and literacy, yet few investigate why these gaps persist.
Indigenous cultural norms, particularly those related to family
and kinship obligations, are identiﬁed as a barrier to greater
inclusion. Yet there has been little research on how Indig-
enous people themselves want to use and manage money.
This lack of knowledge compromises the ability to develop
effective and evidence-based policy for promoting Indig-
enous ﬁnancial inclusion. The “Closing the Gap” policy frame-
work outlines government commitments to reduce Indigenous
disadvantage; however, ﬁnancial inclusion is subsumed into
a broader economic participation and sustainability agenda
(Productivity Commission, 2014).
Industry efforts to promote Indigenous inclusion are also
hampered by a lack of evidence examining their speciﬁc ﬁ-
nancial needs. Social policy researchers call for fairer and cul-
turally appropriate ﬁnancial product and service design which
can better engage Indigenous consumers and offer alterna-
tives to fringe service providers (First Nations Foundation,
2011). However, there is not much discussion on how this can
be implemented in practice. Recent policy measures such as
income management introduced under the Northern Terri-
tory Emergency Response to Indigenous communities in 2007,
may have inadvertently exacerbated Indigenous exclusion. This
policy quarantines half of many government beneﬁts for ap-
proved uses only, including food, clothing, travel and edu-
cation expenses; dictating how money is to be used may have
further compromised Indigenous ﬁnancial capability (Russell,
Yoosuf, & Cattlin, 2011). Changes to social and ICT policies
now favour a centralised approach to service delivery via hub
towns instead of offering local services in remote locations.
However, the lack of local access and content may have wors-
ened digital inclusion and compromised the adoption and usage
of electronic banking delivery channels among remote Indig-
enous consumers (Thomas & Rennie, 2012).
Global research ﬁndings: under-banked and
policy implications
A study on under-banked households in the United States
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2014) highlights how
better understanding of differing characteristics and varying
demand for banking services among under-banked popula-
tion groups can inform the design of effective ﬁnancial prod-
ucts and economic inclusion strategies. Knowledge of common
challenges they face such as unemployment and lower edu-
cation can inform collaborative efforts between policymakers
in industry and public/private entities (such as employment
and social service agencies) that also serve their needs. Having
a bank account does not guarantee long-term participation
in the banking system, as households can and do cycle in and
out the banking system over time. Economic inclusion efforts
not only require banking the un-banked, but also retaining
and better engaging current bank customers to prevent them
from becoming un-banked/under-banked. Also, households
with banking experience have more positive perceptions of
having an account and rely less on alternative ﬁnancial
services.
Financial institutions should more clearly demonstrate the
value in having a bank account, as the under-banked often
perceive non-bank ﬁnancial services to be more conve-
nient, faster, less expensive and presenting lower barriers to
qualiﬁcation. Banks could promote mobile technology to in-
crease convenience, expedite the availability of deposited
funds, and make affordable small-dollar loans available with
streamlined but solid underwriting.
Sociological study of under-banked Indigenous
Australians in remote communities
Our sociological study addresses many of the challenges dis-
cussed above, by exploring the understanding of money in
remote communities from an Indigenous perspective (Indig-
enous money). We also consider policy implications for pro-
moting ﬁnancial inclusion, particularly strengths-based
approaches using Indigenous culture as an enabler, rather than
a barrier, to enhancing the Indigenous ﬁnancial inclusion. Our
methodology can be extended to study money in other cul-
turally and linguistically diverse under-banked community
groups, not just in Australia but across the globe.
Research design and methodology
This paper is based on ethnographic doctoral research using
a post-colonial, relational Indigenous research paradigm
(Chilisa, 2012), which argues that research should reﬂect In-
digenous priorities, and cultural sensitivity should apply to
Table 3 Comparison of ﬁnancial exclusion levels—Indigenous Australians and national average.
National
average
Indigenous
Australians
Financially excluded (combined
unbanked + underbanked)
17.2% 43.1% Source: Connolly, Georgouras, & Hems (2012)
Financial literacy score (FLS) Mean 83.1 Mean 63.9 Source: The Social Research Centre (2011)
Financial knowledge and numeracy Mean 91.9 Mean 70.7 Source: The Social Research Centre (2011)
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all aspects of research design. Indigenous knowledge and in-
tellectual property should increase as a result of research,
enabling communities to work through their own concerns.
Building these learnings into our research has enabled us to
progress this important topic collaboratively with Indig-
enous and non-Indigenous stakeholders. We consulted with
community elders who invited us to undertake research in their
communities, facilitated introductions, and provided guid-
ance on cultural protocols, particularly those related to gender
and respectful communication. We used methods familiar to
the participants, including “yarning circles” (discussions with
community members typically conducted over the course of
a shared meal) and informal conversations, alongside inter-
views and participant observation. Participants’ stories about
money and banking were audio-taped wherever permission
was obtained, and supplemented with ﬁeld-notes and an elec-
tronic journal. Data were stored and interrogated using NVivo
9.2, a computer program that aids the analysis of qualita-
tive data.
This Indigenous-centred approach enabled a more thor-
ough investigation of community needs and preferences than
previous policy and industry approaches, which start from
policy imperatives and providers’ perspectives. Findings from
this study have policy implications for the design of cultur-
ally appropriate ﬁnancial products and services, including con-
sumer education programmes.
Field-work and knowledge-making
Fieldwork was undertaken in Darwin and two remote Indig-
enous communities (referred to as Inland Town and Coastal
Town) in Northern Territory between July 2011 and Septem-
ber 2013. Fifty-three people participated in the remote study,
via ﬁve yarning circles with sixteen participants, thirty-one
interviews and observation at a private workshop with six par-
ticipants. Key informants included consultants, academics,
and service providers with expertise in remote communities.
The majority of the population of Inland Town and Coastal
Town is Indigenous, with more than a third being under 20
years of age. Each town has a distinctive language and tra-
ditional culture, and a history of pre-colonial trade with
Macassan traders from Indonesia. These remote communi-
ties face common challenges; limited employment opportu-
nities cause high unemployment and welfare dependency,
while expensive freight rates drive up prices of everyday ne-
cessities. Chronic housing shortages have led to overcrowd-
ing and high maintenance costs. Both towns have limited
banking and digital infrastructure. Inland Town has a bank
branch while Coastal Town has none. Each town also has a
single community store, which provides Electronic Funds Trans-
fer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) and Automated Teller Ma-
chines (ATMs).
Findings from our study: Indigenous money
This study highlights the cultural distinctiveness of “Indig-
enous money”, and sets the context for an exploration of how
culture and money are inter-related. Indigenous money is dif-
ferent in crucial ways from mainstream, primarily Western
understandings of money, which are at the centre of poli-
cies relating to banking, payments, and welfare in Australia
(Singh, 1997). Participants say that money has been imposed
on them from outside their culture, and does not connect with
traditional Indigenous knowledge systems. Money had no place
in pre-colonial, traditional Indigenous lives, and was intro-
duced to remote communities in the late 1960s, alongside
welfare policies. Although the government has now intro-
duced ﬁnancial education into school curriculum, Indig-
enous elders, as traditional holders of knowledge, say they
are confused about money and unable to lead their people
in using money wisely. Participants particularly lack knowl-
edge of how to control and grow money (wealth creation and
investing). Despite the challenges, participants have adapted
money into their daily lives in culturally distinctive ways.
The domestic ﬁnancial unit in remote Indigenous commu-
nities is larger than the nuclear-household of Western
families—it is better described as household clusters of ex-
tended family and kin. Indigenous money is regularly shared
across these households, alongside other resources, includ-
ing food, clothing, and shelter. These households manage and
control Indigenous money in an informal manner, with resi-
dents “chucking-in” (contributing) whatever amount they feel
they can towards common household expenses. Caring for the
family, rather than money, is the top priority for partici-
pants. Yet regular sharing means that little money is left over
for personal discretionary spending or saving. Cultural obli-
gations can also compete with individuals’ need for control
of their own money. Demand sharing, whereby family can
demand that money and personal banking information be
shared with them, is prevalent in indigenous communities
(Peterson, 1993). Refusal to share can create conﬂict, yet rou-
tinely sharing banking information can heighten privacy and
security concerns. Participants try to cordon off money for
their own use while maintaining relationships, by hiding money
in different bank accounts and prepaying regular expenses to
reduce income at hand. Repeated balance enquiries are made
to check that accounts have not been compromised, and
money is withdrawn as soon as it is received. This usage
pattern leads to a distinctive style of banking, whereby people
incur higher fees yet earn little interest.
Demand sharing, lower incomes and fewer employment op-
portunities also reduce the motivation to save and compro-
mise the ability to achieve individual goals. Money is seen by
many as a “problem” and source of conﬂict, so people avoid
engaging with money matters.
Implications for policy
Our study shows we need to inﬂuence two main areas of policy
in the context of under-banked Indigenous people living in
remote communities, as summarised in Fig. 6. The ﬁrst is
industry/provider policies relating to ensuring culturally ap-
propriate design and delivery of ﬁnancial products and ser-
vices. The second is government policies relating to enhanced
consumer education and awareness.
Indigenous money is disconnected from traditional Indig-
enous knowledge, including laws governing the manage-
ment of values resources. Financial education programmes
must ﬁnd ways to connect with and build upon these tradi-
tional knowledge systems, which elders still hold in remote
communities. Reinforcing positive aspects of existing social
norms (such as community obligations to provide collective
support or individual obligations to ensure collective beneﬁts)—
for example, developing family and community-based
ﬁnancial/consumer education, may better connect with the
needs of remote consumers. Education programmes that can
tailor budgeting tools and ways of keeping track of money to
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the distinctive chuck-in style of making ends meet across
related Indigenous households may prove more relevant and
useful. Programmes enabling Indigenous participants to en-
vision family and community-based goals for money could en-
courage ﬁnancial skills to be practised within families.
Developing tools that facilitate “learning by doing”, includ-
ing the use of innovative technology, may be more likely to
succeed. Building the ﬁnancial capacity of elders can empower
them to role model effective ways to use and preserve money.
The path to achieving individual success with managing In-
digenous money is inextricably linked with the collective. The
ﬁnancial ecosystem should provide ways for Indigenous people
to control their own money without compromising relation-
ships by offering personalised and affordable banking deliv-
ered in local language, and low-cost balance enquiry and
account information. Also, acknowledging saving as caring for
oneself and managing money as an important component of
well-being could better motivate Indigenous people. Mobile
phones, already a popular means of communication for remote
Indigenous users, could also enable mobile banking ser-
vices. Unmet user needs, including access to micro-credit,
micro-enterprise services and opportunities for micro-
savings should be addressed by the industry, based on suc-
cessful models developed for the poor in developing countries.
Conclusions—extending our ﬁndings to global
under-banked policy
Our study shows that by exploring how Indigenous culture in-
ﬂuences the participants’ understanding of money, and their
world-views on ﬁnancial capability and well-being, we can
draw conclusions for the design of culturally appropriate poli-
cies that better meet their needs. These ﬁndings can be ex-
tended to studying other under-banked groups in Australia and
world-wide, and inform the design of user-centred ﬁnancial
products and services (including ﬁnancial/consumer educa-
tion) that meet the needs of different cultural groups.
Australia is one of only a handful of countries where vir-
tually the entire population is banked, yet some areas ex-
perience signiﬁcantly lower physical and digital access to
banking and other service infrastructure, more akin to con-
ditions in developing countries. Given that policymakers in
developing countries face signiﬁcant challenges in provid-
ing ﬁnancial access to large un-banked populations, even in
urban and regional areas, studying the needs of rural/
remote and culturally diverse population groups is a particu-
larly vexatious area. This is where our research, focussing on
user-centred ﬁnancial inclusion policies for harder-to-reach
rural and remote populations, can contribute. Additional areas
of contribution could include policies focused on enhancing
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digital access to ﬁnance, ensuring sustainability of remote ﬁ-
nancial service delivery and culturally appropriate models for
enhancing the ﬁnancial capability for communities with lower
literacy/numeracy, and cultural and language barriers.
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